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The impact of COVID-19 on recent tendencies towards international isolationism has been
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fication, a one standard deviation increase in excess deaths during the outbreak implied
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interwar period and consider the international macroeconomic impact of measures
(not) taken.
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To what extent might health emergencies have an impact oninternational macroeconomic policy? Might countries turnmore inwards following loss of life during the Covid-19
pandemic? There has been much speculation about how the post-
coronavirus world will look. For example, Foreign Policy wrote
that “the coronavirus is killing globalization as we know it”, and
that “the outbreak has been a gift to nativist nationalists and
protectionists, and it is likely to have a long-term impact on the
free movement of people and goods” (Legrain, 2020). In a similar
vein, an article in the New York Times stated that the coronavirus
has come at a time “when the world was already turning inward,
largely in reaction to the global financial crisis of 2008. Nations
have been erecting barriers to the free flow of people, money and
goods”.1 Only history can give us any guidance, and the latter
article points out in passing that the Spanish flu perhaps simply
“accelerated trends that were already underway”. We quantify the
impact of the severity of the impact of the pandemic on openness,
and trade policy in particular, after the First World War, and find
that countries hardest hit had more restrictive trade policies
during the 1920s, even when controlling for participation in the
war.2
Economists have long known that the First World War led to a
definitive break with the globalization of the late-nineteenth
century (see for example, O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999), and
John Maynard Keynes’ famous passage about the end of “an
extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man”,3 remi-
niscing just after the First World War about the lost world of
internationalization that had gone before, has often been used to
illustrate this (see e.g., Harley, 2020). Thus, the war itself has often
been considered to mark the division between the “first era of
globalization” and the relative isolationism that was to follow.
However, no one today could ignore the fact that Keynes was
writing during a major pandemic, the so-called “Spanish” flu,
which hit the world in several waves between 1918 and 1920. We
employ a difference-in-differences strategy, finding that countries
more affected saw increased trade protection subsequently. This is
independent of the similarly positive effect of participating in the
First World War, and a flexible specification reveals that coun-
tries were on parallel trends prior to the pandemic, but diverged
subsequently, with the impact lasting throughout the 1920s until
the onset of the Great Depression in 1929.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The following
section provides a brief overview of the historical background to
our analysis and provides primary historical evidence on the link
between the Spanish flu and trade policy using evidence from the
case of the United States in the run up to the passage of the
infamous Fordney-McCumber tariff of September 21, 1922.
Section “Data” presents our data, section “Empirical strategy”
presents our empirical strategy, and section “Results” gives our
results. Section “Conclusion” concludes.
Historical background
Since the shocks of the First World War and the pandemic
overlapped, both events are discussed here. Figure 1 provides, in a
flow-chart, a visualization of the effects and mechanisms we
discuss below. Here, we make a distinction between proximate
and ultimate causes of governments’ trade policies. We propose
(and test below in a reduced form specification) that there were
two ultimate causes of the increases in tariffs observed in the
1920s: the Spanish flu and the First World War. Both impacted
directly on the economy, which might have promoted revenue-
raising and/or protective tariffs. They might also both have
increased suspicion of foreigners, making protectionist policies
more attractive. Finally, the war is also considered to have played
an important role for the extension of the franchise to women in
many countries, and to the extent that this might have impacted
on the preferences of the electorate, we have also included this
mechanism.
Starting with the war, this had manifold impacts on the World
Economy, as systematically summarized by Broadberry and
Harrison (2005), Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), and Feinstein
et al (2008). The most direct were that it killed people, destroyed
infrastructure and dramatically increased government spending,
most of which went into the “unproductive” war effort. In
addition, front lines, destroyed and requisitioned infrastructure,
naval blockades and naval warfare severely disrupted interna-
tional trade, directly and by disproportionately increasing inse-
curity and corresponding trade costs such as insurance. Workers
and resources were drawn from civil production into the war
itself and the production and provision of war materials. In the
medium run, this created problems for government finance and
economic reconversion after the war. Wounded and traumatized
soldiers needed to return to civilian life. An international over-
supply of heavy industry and basic foodstuffs created domestic
need for adjustment, and lobby groups campaigned for at least
temporary protection after the heroic effort. As noted above,
franchise extensions were another consequence of the collective
efforts, as was the increased importance of parties representing
workers’ interests (see for example Przeworski, 2009). Women
were also given the vote in most places, and de Bromhead (2018)
finds that they were more likely than men to hold protectionist
attitudes, and that where women were entitled to vote tariffs were,
on average, higher.4
Heavily burdened government finance craved revenue, and
defeated countries in particular turned to the printing press. This
was accompanied by balance of payments and banking crises, also
in countries such as the UK, which soon after the war opted for
severe deflationist policies in order to return to the gold standard
(Morys, 2014). Thousands of kilometers of new borders emerged,
as the Treaty of Versailles and the breakdown of the Habsburg
Empire created new states especially in Central and Eastern
Europe. While many of the direct interventions in national and
international markets were – except for Germany—dismantled
soon after the end of the war (Feinstein et al., 2008; Hardach,
1977), the peace treaties failed to commit all parties to the third of
US President Wilson’s 14 points: “the removal, as far as possible,
of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of
trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace
and associating themselves for its maintenance.” (cited after
Fig. 1 Flowchart of the suggested mechanisms. Overview of the suggested
mechanisms between the First World War, the Spanish Flu, and tariffs; see
text for details.
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Hardach, 1977, p. 242).5 So, despite efforts to keep markets open
through the League of Nations, many of these forces created
protectionist backlashes in the 1920s (Findlay and O’Rourke,
2007), since tariff protection often served several goals, although
with minor tradeoffs. Tariffs raised government revenue, aimed
to correct balance of payment imbalances, helped struggling
import-competitors, and provided visible input to political dis-
courses of national reconstruction and nation-building.
Some of these issues might have worked in the same direction
as for our second “ultimate cause”, the Spanish flu, that—on a
global level— hit regions with limited healthcare and public
health capacities harder. Both shocks were related in many ways,
as reflected by the arrow from the war to the flu in Fig. 1. A
significant share of doctors served in the military instead of in
their civilian offices and hospitals. Soldiers spread the disease,
both in the military and when returning home from the war.
Trade disruptions, like the Allied blockade in Europe, affected
food provision and precarious nutritional status affected immune
systems (Spinney, 2018). Little seems to have been written about
the importance of public health interventions in Europe during
the pandemic itself, but we know that, partly due to the war, far
less focus was put on them there than in the US, since commu-
nication about outbreaks was far less transparent among the
belligerent parties. It has been demonstrated that in the US cities
that implemented earlier interventions saw lower rates of trans-
mission (Bootsma and Ferguson, 2007; Hatchett et al., 2007).
The disease thus likely created pressure on authorities to adopt
means and improve access to healthcare, in a similar way to other
factors which have been noted above, such as the presence of
veterans, the franchise extensions to women and poorer sections
of the male population, the rise of trade unions, and social unrest
in general (Feinstein et al., 2008). Such means required funding
and revenues. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that rela-
tively few public health reactions actually occurred before the
1940s, the best documented probably being the creation of a
Federal Department of Health in Canada, a country to which the
pandemic spread to a significant extent through US soldiers on
their way to Europe (Humphries, 2013). Also, in Weimar Ger-
many there was a gradual shift to public healthcare, and the
League of Nations featured a health institution (Spinney, 2018).
On the other hand, at least in the short run, there was a marked
increase in suspicion of foreigners and theories about the origin of
the (assuredly not) Spanish flu during and immediately after the
pandemic (Spinney, 2018). Such trends might have made ways of
raising government revenue that (ostensibly) fell on foreigners,
like raising tariffs, more acceptable. Highlighting a different
version of the same channel, in her popular book on the 1918
influenza pandemic, Laura Spinney (2018)6 argues that Gandhi’s
anticolonial movement, which featured campaigns for a boycott
of British imports and substitution by traditional Indian pro-
duction (see Wolcott, 1991), received a decisive boost from the
tragic outcomes of the Spanish flu in India, although Gandhi had
no direct influence on India’s rising tariffs (cf. Arthi et al., 2020).
So, while admittedly the literature on the macroeconomics of
the Spanish flu and especially on the relationship to policy
openness is virtually non-existent, it is likely that the link we
uncover below worked through one of the following channels,
both difficult to track in existing data: first, since reactions to
pandemics are costly, they create needs for revenue, and espe-
cially at low(er) state capacity customs duties are a convenient
way of raising this (Cagé and Gadenne, 2018). Second, if pan-
demics create a more inward-oriented public discourse, increas-
ing tariffs becomes more tolerable.7
Ultimately, the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 was to
overshadow all aspects of economic policy, and here trade policy
seems to have played a significant role as a reaction to crisis.8
Thus, de Bromhead et al. (2019) demonstrate the impact of trade
policy on trade flows, showing that policy explains the majority of
the UK’s shift to Imperial preference in the 1930s. Otherwise, the
reasons for the far greater outbreak of protectionism in the 1930s
are well known, with Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) demon-
strating that exchange rate policies played a crucial role. Coun-
tries that retained fixed exchange rates under the gold standard
were more susceptible to resorting to tariffs, import quotas and
exchange controls. Their inability to use monetary policy led
them to resort to protectionism in an ultimately futile attempt to
stem the decline in their economies.
In the light of the lack of previous research on the matter, and
in order to provide some more concrete historical evidence for
the link between the Spanish flu and subsequent trade policy
beyond our empirical results below, we turn to primary sources,
and specifically the case of the United States and evidence taken
from Congressional debates. We examined these in the period
from the end of the First World War and until the passage of the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, which represented the largest
even increase in US tariffs (Irwin, 2011) and gave the US one of
the highest tariffs of any creditor nation in the world, leading to
some retaliation by European and Latin American countries.
Besides being proposed as an internal reaction to agricultural
crisis and an economic downturn resulting from monetary sta-
bilization measures, the tariff was the result of the US’s increas-
ingly isolationist stance following its losses during a foreign and
“European” war, and was fueled by a new sense of nationalism, as
well as the idea that American prosperity during the war had been
due to a lack of imports and abundant exports. Its result was
damage both to the domestic and the world economies (see for
example Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan and Ryley, 1994; Irwin, 2017).
When systematically going through the sources, beyond its
immediate impact on military and other government personnel,
as well as occasional calls for a more coordinated federal
response, we found perhaps surprisingly few mentions of influ-
enza or “flu” in the Congressional Record (United States.
Congress, 1919–1922) reflecting the lack of attention it received
by politicians at the time, as noted by others.9 Famously, despite
collapsing with the illness during peace talks at Versailles, and
thus perhaps silencing his opposition to the punitive sanctions on
Germany which many consider to have played a role in pre-
cipitating the Second World War (Flecknoe et al., 2018), Pre-
sident Woodrow Wilson never spoke openly about the illness.10
We did, however, find it mentioned in the context of debates
about raising tariffs a number of times. For example, the
Republican Congressman Caleb R. Layton was particularly pro-
minent in discussions about ensuring a domestic supply of var-
ious products necessary for combatting influenza and other
illnesses. Layton was a physician and served in the House of
Representatives from 1918 to 1920, when he lost to the African
American political activist Alice Dunbar Nelson after opposing
the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill. In 1919 he spoke during a debate on
tariffs on coal-tar products, stressing his medical qualifications,
and noting their use not only in dyes but also for pharmaceuticals
(Cong. Rec. 58:6, p. 6006), and again in 1921, he spoke passio-
nately during the debate on the bill (H. R. 7456—what eventually
became the Fordney McCumber Tariff) “to provide revenue, to
regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the
industries of the United States, and for other purposes.” He stated
that he was “lifetime a firm believer in the policy of the protective
tariff”, and again, as a doctor, he felt obliged to mention the
importance of protection for coal-tar products, of which Phena-
cetin “was found to be of almost priceless value in the treatment
of the late epidemic of influenza” (Cong. Rec. 61:4, pp.
3493–3494). Similarly passionate statements were also made by
Democratic Senator James Thomas Heflin, a notorious white
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supremacist, in relation to a bill (S. 3390) seeking federal funding
for the manufacture of nitrates, and highlighting in particular the
unfortunate experience of establishing a plant in his own state of
Alabama:
“I wish to ask Senators whence the opposition comes that
would seek to prevent America having a nitrate plant of her
own? … This plant at Muscle Shoals was built under great
difficulties. The influenza came just at the time these
thousands of men were there at work. Many of them were
stricken down and many of them died. In the hurry and the
stress and strain money was wasted, doubtless; money was
extravagantly spent, doubtless; but there is no getting away
from the fact that that plant is located at a fine place, a very
desirable place; that it is close to the phosphate beds; that it
is on a fine stream of water; that it is located at one of the
finest water-power sites in the wide world; and that the
Government has spent eighty-odd million dollars on it; and
I submit that there is no justifiable excuse for the fight that
is being made to destroy this bill.” (Cong. Rec. 60:2, pp.
1309–1310).
Then, in 1922, Republican Senator Joseph S. Frelinghuysen Sr.
spoke in a debate regarding Senate bill 1807, “A bill to aid in
stabilizing the coal industry”, noting that “During the influenza
epidemic … one of the greatest elements that aided the spread of
the disease was the high price of coal, which the poor families
could ill afford to purchase”—and thus in favor of regulation of
the industry (Cong. Rec. 62:1, p. 689). There were opposing
voices, of course, and William H. King, the senior Democratic
Senator for Utah (and perhaps not coincidentally the junior
senator for Utah was the Republican Reed Smoot, of Smoot-
Hawley fame) spoke during consideration of the Fordney-
McCumber tariff bill (H. R. 7456) against raising tariffs which
would increase the price of pharmaceuticals, including those used
to treat influenza (Cong. Rec. 62:6, p. 6197), and he spoke again
on a debate on protection for coal-tar products for the same
reason (Cong. Rec. 62:13, p. 13859).
The influence of the pandemic on debates was even felt outside
the realm of trade policy and industrial regulation. For example, in
1922, in a debate on the conference report on the bill (B. R. 9548)
“for the relief of the distressed and starving people of Russia”,
Democratic Senator Henry F. Ashurst noted that the bill would give
“$20,000,000 for relief of distressed Russians; not a penny for relief
of distressed Americans”, and quotes from the Washington Times of
December 21, 1921, where it was reported how after the closing of a
mine “Two thousand men, women, and children, comprising the
populace of a West Virginia town—Minden, in Fayette County—are
literally starving to death” and that “To add to the misery, an
influenza epidemic is sweeping the territory. The death rate has been
alarming. Schools have closed; out of 500 pupils only 101 were able
to attend classes last week” (Cong. Rec. 62:1, p. 677). This, together
with countless similar isolationist sentiments during the debates we
read, not all of which of course explicitly stated the impact of the
pandemic on their thinking, provides some backing for the idea that
the protectionist thinking of contemporaries might have been
influenced by the experience of the influenza epidemic.
This was not restricted to the United States, of course. We also
went through the Australian Parliamentary debates from the
relevant period. There is much discussion of quarantines, vac-
cines, outbreaks on shipping, whether or not to keep churches
open, and the closure of state borders—mirroring to a striking
degree the contemporary debate on COVID-19 in that country.
In one particularly pertinent debate11 on the “Supply Bill (No. 1)
1919–20” it is noted that the effects of the war, the flu and out-
breaks of strikes are all linked, and the protection of various
industries including wheat, wool and dairy produce is discussed,
as well as support and subsidies for the mining industry and plans
for the “development of Australian production and manufacture”.
Data
To investigate more formally the impact of the Spanish flu on
trade openness, we make use of several sources of data.12 For
tariffs we rely on the import-weighted average ad valorem tariff
(AVE), as collected by Lampe and Sharp (2013). This is calculated
as the ratio of customs duty revenues to total imports for
domestic consumption. There are of course a number of issues
with this measure of protectionism, as Lampe and Sharp
acknowledge. First, some of their data for Germany (1914–24) are
interpolated,13 although our results are not sensitive to the
inclusion of that country.14 Second, tariffs at that time were
usually specific, and thus declining prices would automatically
lead to an increase in ad valorem equivalents. However, using
price data from Jordà et al. (2017), we find no significant corre-
lation with our measure of protection. Third, not all protection is
captured by tariffs, since subsidies, quantitative restrictions and
prohibitions are also of importance. While indeed there was wide
use of quantitative restrictions up to the Allied sea blockade of the
Central Powers from March 1915, which also affected neutral
countries in Europe (Hardach, 1977), except for commercial
relationships between especially France and Germany, these were
dismantled quickly after the end of the war in Western and
Central Europe (Hardach, 1977). From then on, import duties
were the main trade frictions (Hardach, 1977; Feinstein et al.,
2008). However, the fact that the League of Nations in
1927 sponsored a conference on import and export restrictions
and in 1929 the “International Convention for the Abolition of
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions” was adopted
(Boyce, 1987), might create the impression that in the 1920s, as
was to be the case in the 1930s, non-tariff restrictions were
omnipresent. They were probably not. The Prohibition Conven-
tion contained the possibility of exempting certain goods on a
country level, and annexes contained these exemptions. Most had
to do with the possibility of strategically limiting exports, and
regarding imports we find clauses only referring to coal, coke,
peat, lignite and briquettes in Germany and synthetic and organic
dyestuffs and colors in the UK, and very little for elsewhere.15 We
therefore assume that quotas did not distort the level of protec-
tion as measured by average tariffs.
Our main analysis is conducted using data for measuring the
impact of the Spanish flu from Ansart et al. (2009) who estimate
the number of cumulative excess deaths due to the Spanish flu
pandemic. The reported excess mortality is defined as the dif-
ference between the observed and the predicted number of all-
cause deaths using the pre period 1906–1917 as baseline) during
the pandemic. The exact pandemic period differs from country to
country and is defined as the period in which the observed
number of deaths exceeded a given threshold. In all countries, it
starts during 1918 and ends at some point in the first half of 1919.
Thus, the relatively minor peak of the flu in April 1920 experi-
enced by several countries is not accounted for by the excess
mortality measure. Besides its drawbacks, using all-cause excess
mortality is probably the best way to measure the severity of the
pandemic across countries as it is highly comparable. Deaths are
rather accurately measured in most countries and using all-cause
excess mortality is then less prone to measurement error than any
measure of flu-specific deaths, which would largely depend on the
right diagnosis of medical personnel, which may differ vastly
across countries. This core sample consists of 12 European
countries, for which tariffs are also available.16
As discussed earlier, until now the increase in protectionism in
the 1920’s has been explained with the adverse effects of World
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War I. Clearly, the concurrent timing of World War I is the main
concern with our analysis: as the pandemic started when the war
ended, we have to account for the war to be able to demonstrate
an independent effect of the flu. We therefore include a measure
of intensity with which a country was affected by the war by using
the number of battle deaths suffered during the war in some of
the specifications. This measure is taken from the “Correlates of
War project” (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010).
As a robustness check and to increase external validity, we also
present results using an extended sample using data from Barro
et al. (2020), who present death rates (relative to total population)
for the flu and for World War I. It is important to note that this
data presents flu-specific death rates for countries where this
measure is available and all-cause excess mortality rates where
flu-specific deaths are not available. Barro et al. note, however, a
“close correspondence” for those countries where both measures
are available. For some countries the timing of deaths is also
extrapolated from data of neighboring countries. An advantage of
this data, however, is the much more diverse set of countries, a
larger number of which did not participate in the First World
War. Ultimately, we use data from 29 countries17 as a number of
countries cannot be included for our purposes because tariffs are
not available, they were subject to colonial relationships or forced
tariffs (such as China) or were otherwise obvious outliers in this
respect such as the Soviet Union.
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Tariffs are measured
annually from 1900 to 1939, while the number of excess deaths
and battle deaths, has just one observation for each country.
In Fig. 2, we map the distribution of excess deaths caused by
the Spanish flu in Europe alone while Fig. 3 shows the distribu-
tion of the decadal average level of tariffs for the 1910s, 1920s,
and 1930s, with darker shades indicating higher levels of deaths/
tariffs. The extreme protectionism of the 1930s is very clear.18
Empirical strategy
To identify the effect of excess deaths on the tariffs after the
Spanish flu pandemic, we implement a difference-in-differences
strategy. This method allows us to obtain an estimate of the
average effect of excess deaths on tariffs, i.e., the average treat-
ment effect. Originally the difference-in-differences method was
employed in the social sciences to study the effect of new policies.
The method attempts to simulate a natural experiment dividing
the population into two groups, the treated group (the group
experiencing the new policy) and a control group (a group with
similar characteristics not experiencing the policy). The two
groups are then compared before and after the treatment to
establish the average treatment effect of the policy. In our setting,
the “treatment” is the level of excess deaths due to the pandemic.
Thus, all countries are unaffected before the pandemic but, with
the event of the pandemic, some countries are more affected than
others. This method allows us to compare the change in the level
of tariffs across countries and time, to find the average effect of
excess deaths on tariffs.19
To have a correctly specified model, the timing of the effect is
important. We hypothesize that the effect will start after the
beginning of the first peak in 1918. Furthermore, we allow for the
effect to take place before the end of the pandemic, because it is
likely that affected countries took measures against the disease,
one of which could be to become less open. These measures could
have been implemented while the pandemic was still in progress.
An advantage of this is that the time of treatment coincides with
the end of the First World War, which is useful for our analysis.
To find the average treatment effect of excess deaths, we start
by estimating the following difference-in-differences model
tariffit ¼ β0 þ β1post1918t*ln excessdeathsð Þiþ
β2post1918t þ ci þ θt þ εit;
ð1Þ
where tariffit is the tariff level in year t for country i, post1918t is a
dummy taking the value 1 for the years 1919–1939 and zero
otherwise. Our main explanatory variable, ln(excessdeaths)i, is the
log of excess deaths caused by the Spanish flu. The specification
also includes country fixed effects, ci, and year fixed effects, θt.
The country fixed effects control for any time invariant char-
acteristics of each country and are allowed to be correlated with
the explanatory variables. εit is the error term clustered at the
country level. Our main parameter of interest is β1, which gives us
the average treatment effect.
As noted above, the end of the pandemic coincides with the
end of the war, and thus a major concern in Eq. 1 is that we do
not control for the war. Indeed, the above discussion makes it
likely that countries experiencing the war more severely imple-
mented higher tariffs afterwards. Therefore, for comparison, we
also estimate the average treatment effect for the number of battle
deaths during the war as:
tariffit ¼ β0 þ β1post1918t*ln battledeathsð Þiþ
β2post1918t þ ci þ θt þ εit;
ð2Þ
where ln(battledeaths)i is the natural logarithm of (1+ the
number of deaths in battle) during the First World War. Note
that only about half of the countries in our sample participated in
the war and only these will have positive values in the number of
deaths.20 This means that the number of battle deaths is only
positive for these countries.
Table 1 Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Core sample
excess deaths 158,751.9 176,442.8 10,650 544,288
battle deaths 393,691.1 597,343.6 0 1,773,700
Tariff 0.105 0.077 0.008 0.330
Extended sample
flurate 0.913 0.194 5.220 0.220
battlerate 0.385 0.664 0.000 2.650
Tariff 0.155 0.102 0.008 0.619
Fig. 2 Rates of excess deaths caused by the Spanish Flu from 1918 to
1919. Excess death rates are computed as the number of excess deaths per
expected deaths. Darker grays indicate higher excess deaths. The countries
shaded diagonally participated in WW1.
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Finally, to assess the relative significance of our two treatments,
we also estimate a version where both the pandemic and the war
are included simultaneously.
Results
Table 2 provides the results of estimating Eq. 1 to 3 using our core
sample.
Despite few observations, we obtain significant results at
standard significance levels. From column 1 in Table 2 it is clear
that there is a positive correlation between the number of excess
deaths and the level of tariffs after 1918. We find that a 1 percent
change in the number of excess deaths leads to a tariff increase
equal to 0.017 percentage points. In terms of standard deviations,
one standard deviation more excess deaths implies 0.022 per-
centage point higher tariffs, corresponding to an increase of one
third of a standard deviation in tariffs. From column 2, it is also
clear that the number of battle deaths in the First World War had
an important effect on tariffs after 1918. On average, one percent
more battle deaths results in 0.004 percentage points higher tar-
iffs. In terms of standard deviations, the result is similar to excess
deaths, given that one standard deviation more battle deaths
implies 0.026 percentage point higher tariffs. It is thus clear that
the effect of the war is also not negligible. However, in column 3
where both the effect of the pandemic and the effect of the war
are estimated together, the estimate on ln(excessdeaths) remains
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent
level. The effect of excess flu deaths is in fact stronger than that of
battle deaths when including both simultaneously. However, it
should also be kept in mind that the number of battle deaths is
zero for half of our sample. This, as well as the fact that excess
deaths and participation in the war are correlated due to
returning soldiers spreading the illness make it difficult to com-
pare the size of the coefficients. Nevertheless, these results toge-
ther imply that the number of deaths in battle during the war
alone was most likely not the only important determinant of
tariffs: a non-trivial determinant was indeed mortality during the
Spanish flu.
A difference-in-differences model relies on the assumption of a
common trend. This assumption states that, in the absence of
treatment (the pandemic/the war), the difference in tariffs
Fig. 3 Average tariffs in the decades 1910s, 1920s and 1930s. The maps show standardized tariff intervals, in order to make the decades comparable to
one another. Panel (A) shows the average tariffs for 1910–1919, Panel (B) shows the average tariffs for the interval 1920–1929, and Panel (C) shows the
average tariffs for 1930–1939.
Table 2 Regression results.
Dependent variable is: tariff (1) (2) (3)
after1918 × ln(excessdeaths) 0.017***(0.004) 0.008***(0.002)
after1918 × ln(battledeaths) 0.004***(0.001) 0.003***(0.001)
after1918 −0.197***(0.040) −0.034**(0.011) −0.117***(0.030)
Year FE Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
Observations 480 480 480
Number of countries 12 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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between the treatment group and the control group would be
constant. In our case this implies that the difference in tariffs
before and after 1918 would be constant between countries, had
they not experienced the flu or the war. The common trend
assumption can be tested by estimating a flexible differences-in-
differences model, where ln(excessdeaths) and ln(battledeaths)
interact with year dummies including the pre-treatment period.
The effect of the two variables is thus allowed to differ in each
year. If the assumption holds, all estimates before 1918 should be
insignificant, thus showing no trend prior to treatment. In this
way, we can also determine when the effects died out, as we
expect they might have done with the onset of the Great
Depression. Due to the small sample size, we estimate these
specifications separately. The results can be seen in Fig. 4.
For both the pandemic and the war, there is no clear pre-trend
given that almost none of the coefficients are significantly dif-
ferent from zero before 1919. There are a few negative and sig-
nificant coefficients for both excess deaths and battle deaths in the
years during the war. The significant negative estimates during
this period could simply reflect that countries participating in the
war were more open then, since imports were fundamental for
national supply, and countries participating in the war were more
affected by the flu. Undoubtedly, the war period is unusual in
many respects and it is thus reassuring that the only significant
estimates before 1919 are during this period.
Thus, without any clear pre-trend, we can conclude that the
assumption of a common trend holds. Moreover, Fig. 4 reveals
nicely that the coefficients become significant after 1918. As for
Table 2, it is clear that both ln(excessdeaths) and ln(batteldeaths)
play a role in explaining the tariffs. The effects from the pandemic
seem to disappear earlier but, as expected, by the beginning of the
1930s all seem to have vanished. This is consistent with historical
events. After 1929 and the Great Depression, countries started to
become more protectionist for reasons which, ten years after both
shocks, seem to have outweighed the previous determinants.
Figures A3–A4 in the supplementary information file show the
results when using the extended sample consisting of 29 coun-
tries. As mentioned in section “Data”, for the extended sample we
have (flu) death rates instead of excess deaths. We thus exchange
the variables for excess deaths in Eqs. 1 and 2 with flurate and
battlerate. Figure A3 shows the estimations separately,
corresponding to Fig. 4 using the core sample. Due to the larger
sample, however, it is also possible to include both flurate and
batterate in the same flexible estimation, and these results are
shown in Fig. A4. Both figures show the same pattern as was
demonstrated above, with positive effects both from the flu rate
and the battle rate. Although it is less clear than in the smaller
sample, it should also be remembered that this larger sample
consists of a very diverse set of countries and that especially the
variable flu rate is very prone to measurement error, as noted
above. However, another advantage is that this more diverse
sample also allows us to conduct the analysis using only those
countries which did not participate in the war, addressing more
directly the aforementioned concern about the confounding
timing and effect of the war as well as the fact that the severity
with which the country was affected by it is likely to be correlated
with the severity of the flu. Estimating only on countries not
participating in the war then presents another test of a separate
flu effect. Figure A5 shows the point estimates, clearly indicating a
positive effect of the flu on tariffs.
Conclusion
The impact of pandemics on trade policy is deserving of more
attention. We find that it was not only the First World War which
led to protection in the 1920s, but also the Spanish flu, and future
analyses have the potential to add substantially to this preliminary
work, for example by investigating the link to public health
policy, which we might assume played a role for determining the
severity of the outbreak. This provides an important new
dimension to the debate today about the trade-off between the
economic benefits versus the human costs of relaxing public
health restrictions. It might be the case that the domestic benefits
could to a substantial extent be offset by tendencies towards
international isolationism.
For now, we offer this simple warning: policymakers and the
media must take seriously the impact on isolationist policy that
the present pandemic might unleash. It is a cliché, but if history
teaches us nothing else, it is that we should be wary of making the
same mistakes twice, and we should be cautious that the 2020 s do
not follow the pattern of the 1920s, if we are to avoid the turmoil
the interwar period witnessed. We sincerely hope that our find-
ings do not generalize.
Data availability
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no new datasets were
generated during the current study. We combined data docu-
mented in Ansart et al. (2009), Barro et al. (2020), Lampe/Sharp
(2013), and Clemens and Williamson (2004), subject to the data
availability policies of those papers. The digitalized (United
States) Congressional Record (Bound Edition) is available online
at https://www.govinfo.gov/ (last accessed 20 February 2021).
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Notes
1 Ruchir Sharma, “The Pandemic Isn’t Changing Everything”, New York Times, May
3, 2020.
2 Marcano (2020) makes similar speculations but provides limited quantitative
analysis.
3 “What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which
came to an end in August 1914! … The inhabitant of London could order by
telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in
such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his
doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth
Fig. 4 Estimated coefficients from a flexible model using ln(excessdeaths)
or ln(battledeaths) as explanatory variable. Panel (A) shows the point
estimates from a flexible difference-in-differences model with ln
(excessdeaths) on tariff. Panel (B) shows the point estimates from a flexible
difference-in-differences model with ln(battledeaths) on tariff. The base year
is 1918 and the error bars show p < 0.1 based on robust standard errors,
clustered at the country level.
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in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world … or he
could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the
townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or
information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and
comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other
formality … most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain,
and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation
from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism
and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and
exclusion … appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of
social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in
practice.” -Keynes (1920, pp. 9–10).
4 Aggregate preferences may also be affected by other factors. Gozgor (2020), for
example, shows that demographics, health and educational levels are related to trust
in the government during the current COVID-19 crisis.
5 The non-adoption of this principle is often attributed to Wilson’s relatively weak
position in trade liberalization, as at the same time the US was turning more—non-
discriminatorily— protectionist (Hardach, 1977, p. 242). Nevertheless, this “sorry
result” (ibid., p. 243) might also be connected to, as Spinney (2018) suggests, the fact
that Wilson and his advisor Edward House suffered from influenza during the 1919
Paris Conference, and more importantly suffered from a related stroke later that year
that could have compromised Wilson’s strength in a way that meant that he might
otherwise have been able to push more strongly for the US to join the League of
Nations. This, of course, remains speculative counterfactual history.
6 Cf. Shyam A, Krishna, “How the Spanish flu changed the course of Indian history:
Gandhi survived the pandemic that united Indians against the British”, Gulf News,
March 15, 2020.
7 During the COVID-19 pandemic, enforced lockdowns have given a more direct
economic incentive, due to rising unemployment and the failure of firms.
8 Although falling prices and falling economic activity explain a larger share of the
post-1929 trade collapse, see de Bromhead et al. (2019) and Irwin (1998).
9 We searched all volumes of Congressional Record from November 1918 until
September 1922, and further examined incidences of the words “tariff” and “duty/
duties” in proximity of “influenza” and “flu”, which produced several hits in 58 Cong.
Rec. (Bound)—Volume 58, Part 6 (September 13, 1919 to October 4, 1919), 60 Cong.
Rec. (Bound)—Volume 60, Part 2 (January 7, 1921 to January 28, 1921), 61 Cong.
Rec. (Bound)—Volume 61, Part 4 (June 29, 1921 to July 22, 1921), 62 Cong. Rec.
(Bound)— Volume 62, Part 1 (December 5, 1921 to January 11, 1922), 62 Cong. Rec.
(Bound)—Volume 62, Part 6 (April 13, 1922 to May 8, 1922), 62 Cong. Rec. (Bound)
—Volume 62, Part 13 (December 5, 1921 to September 22, 1922). Many of these hits,
however, were pure coincidence of mentions on the same page or referred to
“military duty” and the like.
10 See note 5 above.
11 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives
Official Hansard No. 26, 1919. Wednesday, 25 June 1919, Seventh Parliament,
Seventh Session.
12 All data are available upon request.
13 Interpolations are also made for revenue for Spain after 1935, and there is a change in
the data source (but no interpolation) for the Netherlands in 1914.
14 Table A1 and Figure A2 in the supplementary information file presents results
excluding Germany.
15 The text of the convention (League of Nations Treaty Series 393) can be found at
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0651.pdf. Article 4 of
the Convention states that, among others, it did not prevent “prohibitions or
restrictions imposed for the protection of public health or for the protection of
animals or plants against disease, insects and harmful parasites”.
16 Denmark, France, England, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Scotland,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
17 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.
18 For the developments in tariffs, see Fig. A1 in the supplementary information file.
Here, we graph tariffs over time along with the excess deaths rates for each of the 12
countries in the core sample.
19 For more about the theoretical setting of the difference-in-differences method, we
refer to Wooldridge (2010).
20 Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland all remained
neutral.
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